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Abstract
We define and study a new cryptographic primitive, named One-One Constrained Pseudorandom
Functions. In this model there are two parties, Alice and Bob, that hold a common random string
K, where Alice in addition holds a predicate f : [N ]→ {0, 1} and Bob in addition holds an input
x ∈ [N ]. We then let Alice generate a key Kf based on f and K, and let Bob evaluate a value Kx
based on x and K. We consider a third party that sees the values (x, f,Kf ) and the goal is to allow
her to reconstruct Kx whenever f(x) = 1, while keeping Kx pseudorandom whenever f(x) = 0. This
primitive can be viewed as a relaxation of constrained PRFs, such that there is only a single key
query and a single evaluation query.
We focus on the information-theoretic setting, where the one-one cPRF has perfect correctness
and perfect security. Our main results are as follows.
1. A Lower Bound. We show that in the information-theoretic setting, any one-one cPRF for
punctured predicates is of exponential complexity (and thus the lower bound meets the upper
bound that is given by a trivial construction). This stands in contrast with the well known
GGM-based punctured PRF from OWF, which is in particular a one-one cPRF. This also implies
a similar lower bound for all NC1.
2. New Constructions. On the positive side, we present efficient information-theoretic constructions
of one-one cPRFs for a few other predicate families, such as equality predicates, inner-product
predicates, and subset predicates. We also show a generic AND composition lemma that preserves
complexity.
3. An Amplification to standard cPRF. We show that all of our one-one cPRF constructions can be
amplified to a standard (single-key) cPRF via any key-homomorphic PRF that supports linear
computations. More generally, we suggest a new framework that we call the double-key model
which allows to construct constrained PRFs via key-homomorphic PRFs.
4. Relation to CDS. We show that one-one constrained PRFs imply conditional disclosure of secrets
(CDS) protocols.
We believe that this simple model can be used to better understand constrained PRFs and related
cryptographic primitives, and that further applications of one-one constrained PRFs and our double-
key model will be found in the future, in addition to those we show in this paper.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we define and study a new cryptographic primitive, named One-One Constrained
Pseudorandom Functions. In this model there are two parties, Alice and Bob, that hold a
common random string K. In addition, Alice holds a predicate f : [N ] → {0, 1} and Bob
holds an input x ∈ [N ]. We then let Alice generate a key Kf based on f and K, and let
Bob evaluate a value Kx based on x and K. We consider a third party that sees the values
(x, f,Kf ) and the goal is to allow her to reconstruct Kx whenever f(x) = 1, while keeping
Kx pseudorandom whenever f(x) = 0.
This primitive can be viewed as a relaxation of constrained PRFs, such that there is
only a single key query and a single evaluation query. In a constrained PRF (first defined
in [12,13,23]), there is a master secret key msk with which it is possible to evaluate the PRF
on all inputs x, and in addition there are constrained keys skf respective to predicates f ,
where skf is derived from msk, such that skf allows to evaluate the PRF only on inputs x
where f(x) = 1, but on all points where f(x) = 0 the PRF value remains pseudorandom
even given skf . Through this point of view, K is the master secret key of the PRF, Kx is
the evaluation of the PRF on an input x and Kf is a constrained key for the predicate f .
We believe that the simplified model of one-one cPRF can be used to better understand
constrained PRFs and related cryptographic primitives, and that further applications of
one-one constrained PRFs will be found in the future, in addition to those we show in this
paper.
Our Contributions. Our main focus is on the information-theoretic setting, where we require
perfect correctness and perfect security. Our main results are as follows.
1. A Lower Bound. We show that in the information-theoretic setting, any one-one cPRF
for punctured predicates is of exponential complexity (and thus the lower bound meets
the upper bound that is given by a trivial construction). This stands in contrast with
the well known GGM-based punctured PRF from OWF, which is in particular a one-one
cPRF. This also implies a similar lower bound for all NC1.
2. New Constructions. On the positive side, we present efficient information-theoretic
constructions of one-one cPRFs for a few other predicate families, such as equality
predicates, inner-product predicates, and subset predicates. We also show a generic AND
composition lemma that preserves complexity.
3. An Amplification to cPRF. We define a special double-key model and show that any
one-one cPRF in this model, when combined with a key-homomorphic PRF, can support
multiple evaluation queries. We then show that all of our constructions can be initialized
in the double-key model, which implies that all of our constructions can be amplified
to a standard (single-key) cPRF via any key-homomorphic PRF that supports linear
computations. More generally, this approach reduces the task of constructing constrained
PRFs to the possibly simpler task of constructing one-one constrained PRFs in the
double-key model, and we believe that this framework will have more applications in the
future.
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4. Relation to CDS. We show that one-one constrained PRFs imply conditional disclosure
of secrets (CDS) protocols, a cryptographic primitive that is used to construct secure
protocols such as attribute based encryption, symmetrically-private information retrieval
protocols, and secret-sharing schemes.
5. Computational Constructions. To complete the picture, we also go over existing compu-
tational cPRFs in the literature, which are in particular computational one-one cPRFs.
2 Technical Overview
2.1 A Lower Bound
We begin with describing our lower bound theorem and its proof. Consider the family of
punctured predicates fy over some field F, such that for all x, y ∈ F it hold that fy(x) = 1 if
and only if x 6= y. We show that any perfect one-one cPRF for this predicate family must
have keys Kfy of size Ω(|F|). To show that, we first argue that for every x ∈ F it must be
that Kx has at least one bit of entropy, even given all of the values {Kx′}x′ 6=x. This is due
to the correctness and security properties respective to the predicate fx, which means that
Kfx allows to reconstruct all {Kx′}x′ 6=x while keeping Kx random. Secondly, due to the fact
that Kfy allows to compute {Kx}x 6=y (by correctness), and since each such Kx has at least
one independent bit of entropy (by the previous claim), it must be the case that Kfy has at
least |F| − 1 = Ω(|F|) bits of entropy.
2.2 New Constructions
A Generic Construction. We now describe a simple one-one constrained PRF for general
functions over some field F with complexity O(F). In this construction, we choose a random bit
ky
$← {0, 1} for every possible input y, and let the common random string be a concatenation
of all of those values K = {ky}y∈F. Alice, which holds a predicate f , returns the values Ky
for all the inputs y such that f(y) = 1, and Bob, which holds an input x, simply returns
Kx = kx. Security and correctness follow immediately (in fact, this construction is also
secure with multiple key queries and evaluation queries). The size of the common random
string is therefore at most |F|, and for a specific function f , the size of Kf is |f−1(1)|.
Equality Testing. Our efficient construction for equality testing over a field F is as follows.
The common random string K consists of two random field elements k0, k1. The functions
that Alice and Bob compute over their inputs x and fy respectively, where fy(x) = 1 if and
only if x = y, are identical: Kx = k1x+ k0 and Kfy = k1y+ k0. This is essentially a degree-1
random polynomial computed over two elements, therefore Kx and Kfy look independently
random as long as x 6= y. This construction can be generalized to any constant number of
evaluation / key queries by using a random polynomial of higher degree.
Subset Predicates. Subset predicates are defined with respect to a universe [N ] =
{1, . . . , N}, where the input space is all subsets X ⊆ [N ] and the predicates fY are char-
acterized by subsets Y ⊆ [N ] such that fY (X) = 1 if and only if X ⊆ Y . Our efficient
construction for subset predicates is as follows. For every i ∈ [N ] there is a random bit ki
in the common string K. We then define KX = ⊕i∈Xki and KfY = {ki}i∈Y . It is easy to
see correctness. In addition, whenever X * Y , there exists an ki /∈ KfY that completely
randomizes KX .
ITC 2020
13:4 One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Functions
Inner-Product Predicates. Inner-product predicates for vectors of length ` over a field F
are defined such that for every x,y ∈ F` it holds that fy(x) = 1 if and only if 〈y,x〉 = 0. We
now describe our efficient construction. The common random string K consists of a random
vector v and a random field element w. We then define Kfy = wy + v and Kx = 〈v,x〉.
Correctness holds since whenever 〈y,x〉 = 0 it holds that 〈Kfy ,x〉 = Kx. Security holds
since v has one degree of freedom given Kfy ,y and therefore it completely randomizes Kx.
2.3 Amplification via Key-Homomorphic PRF
We consider one-one cPRFs that satisfy an additional property and show that such one-one
cPRFs can be boosted to standard (single-key) cPRFs via key-homomorphic PRFs. We then
show that all of our information-theoretic one-one cPRFs satisfy this property, thus receiving
new cPRF constructions.
In more detail, we require an alternative algorithm for Alice, that on input K, f produces
a double-key (Kf , Kˆf ). Such double-key should have the property that Kˆf looks uniformly
random even given Kf , but on the other hand, given both of the key parts (Kf , Kˆf ) it should
be possible to reconstruct Kx for all x (regardless of f(x)).
Recall that in a key-homomorphic PRF, given an evaluation PRFk(x) of the PRF over
some input x and a key k, it is possible to publicly evaluate a function g over the key
which results in the value PRFg(k)(x). Our construction uses a key-homomorphic PRF
to homomorphically evaluate the function that takes a double-key (Kf , Kˆf ) and outputs
Kx. Security relies on the fact that Kˆf looks uniform even given Kf , which implies that
multiple evaluations of the form PRFKˆf (x) look uniform by the security of the PRF. In the
construction we define the cPRF evaluation as rx := PRFKx(x). In the security proof we use
the homomorphic evaluation procedure to convert PRFKˆf (x) into rx = PRFKx(x).
Lastly, we show that all of our information-theoretic constructions can be instantiated
in the double-key model, where the required homomorphic computation is linear. In more
detail, in the equality testing construction we let Ky = k0 + yk1 and Kˆy = yk1, in the
subset predicates construction we define KY = {ki}i∈Y and KˆY = {ki}i∈[N ]/Y and in the
inner-product construction we define Ky = wy+ v and Kˆy = w.
2.4 One-One Constrained PRFs and CDS Protocols
We study the connection between one-one constrained PRFs and CDS protocols. CDS
protocols is a cryptographic primitive, introduced by Gertner et al. [20]. In a CDS protocol,
each of two parties, Alice and Bob, holds a private input and sends one message to a referee,
which knows the inputs of the parties, and should learn a secret held by the parties if and
only if the inputs of the parties satisfy some condition (e.g., if the inputs are equal).
CDS protocols can be easily generalized into multi-party CDS protocols, and they are
used to construct attribute based encryption [5,18,28], symmetrically-private information
retrieval protocols [20], priced oblivious transfer [1], and secret-sharing schemes [2, 3, 8, 9, 24].
We present a transformation from one-one constrained PRFs to CDS protocols. In
particular, we show that a one-one constrained PRF implies a CDS protocol for the index
predicate. By the reduction of [18] from CDS protocols for general predicates to CDS
protocols for the index predicate, we obtain a transformation from one-one constrained PRFs
to CDS protocols for general predicates. This transformation preserve complexity, i.e., the
message size of the resulting CDS protocol is the complexity of the one-one constrained PRF.
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Private Simultaneous Messages Protocols. Another similar primitive is private simultan-
eous messages (PSM) protocols, presented by Feige et al. [16], which is a private case of
MPC protocols. In a PSM protocol, each of the parties, Alice and Bob, holds a private input
for a two-input function, and each of them sends only one message to a referee, which is
based on its input and a common random string, such that the referee should be able to
compute the function on the inputs of Alice and Bob using the messages it gets, without
learn any additional information about the inputs of the parties. As CDS protocols, PSM
protocols can be generalized into multi-party PSM protocols, and they imply some other
cryptographic protocols, such as constant round MPC protocols [22], generalized oblivious
transfer protocols [22], and zero-information Arthur-Merlin protocols [4].
The best known PSM protocol for general functions f : [N ]× [N ]→ {0, 1} has message
size O(
√
N) [7], so by our lower bound of Ω(N) on the complexity of one-one constrained
PRFs, we cannot get a transformation that preserve complexity from PSM protocols to
one-one constrained PRFs. There is a transformation that preserve message size from PSM
protocols to CDS protocols [7, 20]; the other direction (an existence of transformation from
CDS protocols to PSM protocols) is an open problem, and although there is no evidence that
shows an equivalence or separation between CDS and PSM protocols, the best known CDS
protocols [25] have better message size than the best known PSM protocols [7]. Studying
the connections between one-one constrained PRFs and CDS protocols or PSM protocols
may help understanding the connection between CDS protocols and PSM protocols and the
bounds on the message size of CDS and PSM protocols.
3 Preliminaries
Notations. For any n ∈ N we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. For any set S we use
s
$← S to denote a uniformly random sample s from S. For any distribution X we use x← X
to denote a value x that is sampled according to the distribution X. For any n ∈ N we use
Un to denote the uniform distribution over the strings of length n, and for any set S we use
US to denote the uniform distribution over the elements in S.
3.1 Entropy and Indistinguishability
I Definition 1 (Shannon Entropy). For a random variable X and x ∈ sup(X), the sample
entropy of x with respect to X is HX(x) = log (1/Pr[X = x]). The Shannon entropy of X is
then defined as
H(X) = Ex←X [HX(x)] .
For random variables X,Y , the Shannon entropy of X conditioned on Y is
H(X|Y ) = H(X,Y )−H(Y ) .
I Definition 2 (Statistical Distance). The statistical distance between two random variables
X1, X2 over a finite domain X is
∆(X1, X2) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|Pr[X1 = x]− Pr[X2 = x]| .
We say that X1, X2 are δ-close if ∆(X1, X2) ≤ δ.
X1, X2 are 0-close if and only if Pr[X1 = x] = Pr[X2 = x] for all x ∈ X , and in that
case we say that they are identically distributed.
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A function ε(·) is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large
n’s, it holds that ε(n) < 1/p(n). We define three notions of indistinguishability as follows.
I Definition 3 (Indistinguishability). Let X = {Xn}n∈N, Y = {Yn}n∈N be two distribution
ensembles.
1. X and Y are perfectly indistinguishable if for every n ∈ N, the random variables Xn and
Yn are identically distributed.
2. X and Y are statistically indistinguishable if there exists a negligible function ε(·) such
that for every n ∈ N, Xn and Yn are ε(n)-close.
3. X and Y are computationally indistinguishable if for every non-uniform ppt distinguisher
D, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that for every n ∈ N,
|[Pr[D(Xn) = 1]− [Pr[D(Yn) = 1]| < ε(n) .
3.2 Notions of Pseudorandom Functions
I Definition 4 (Constrained PRFs). A constrained pseudorandom function (cPRF) for a pre-
dicate family F and an input space X is defined by the algorithms (KeyGen,Eval,Con,ConEval)
where:
KeyGen(1λ) is a ppt algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a
master key msk.
Eval(msk, x) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the master secret key msk
and an input x ∈ X , and outputs a string rx ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Con(msk, f) is a ppt algorithm that takes as input the master secret key msk and a
predicate f ∈ F , and outputs a constrained key skf .
ConEval(skf , x) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a constrained key skf and
an input x ∈ X , and outputs a string r′x ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Correctness of Constrained Keys. The scheme is correct if for all x ∈ X and f ∈ F for
which f(x) = 1, and for all msk← KeyGen(1λ), skf ← Con(msk, f), it holds that
Eval(msk, x) = ConEval(skf , x) .
(Single-Key) Pseudorandomness. The security requirement is captured via a game between
a challenger C and an adversary A as follows.
C computes msk← KeyGen(1λ).
In an order of her choice, A makes an arbitrary number of evaluation queries, a single
challenge query and a single key query:
Evaluation Query: A selects x ∈ X and sends it to C. In return, C computes
rx ← Eval(msk, x) and sends it to A.
Challenge Query: A selects x∗ ∈ X and sends it to C. In return, C computes
rx∗ ← Eval(msk, x∗) and samples a bit b $← {0, 1}. If b = 0, it sends rx∗ to A,
otherwise it sends to A a random value u← U|rx∗ |.
Key Query: A selects f∗ ∈ F and sends it to C. In return, C computes skf∗ ←
Con(msk, f∗) and sends skf∗ to A.
C sends to A a bit b′.
The advantage of A in the game is Pr[b = b′]− 12 where the probability is over the coins
of C and A. The adversary A is admissible if f∗(x∗) = 0 and x∗ does not appear in any
of the evaluation queries. The scheme is computationally secure if for any ppt admissible
adversary A, her advantage in the game is negl(λ).
We define key-selective pseudorandomness identically to the definition above, except that
A is forced to make the key query first.
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I Definition 5 (Key-Homomorphic PRFs). A key-homomorphic pseudorandom function
(khPRF) for an input space X , a key space K, and a function family G = {Gn : Kn → K}n∈N,
is defined by the algorithms (KeyGen,Eval,HomKeyEval) where:
KeyGen(1λ) is a ppt algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a
key sk ∈ K and possibly public parameters pp.
Eval(sk, x) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a key sk ∈ K and an input
x ∈ X , and outputs rx ∈ {0, 1}∗.
HomKeyEval(g, rx) is a ppt algorithm that takes as input a function g ∈ G and a value
rx ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a value rˆx ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Correctness of Homomorphic Key Evaluation. The scheme is correct if for all x ∈ X , all
g ∈ G where g : Kn → K, and all {ski}i∈[n] ∈ K, it holds that
HomKeyEval (g,Eval(sk1, x), . . . ,Eval(skn, x)) = Eval (g(sk1, . . . , skn), x) .
Pseudorandomness. The security requirement is captured via a game between a challenger
C and an adversary A as follows.
C computes sk← KeyGen(1λ).
In an order of her choice, A makes an arbitrary number of evaluation queries and a
single challenge query:
Evaluation Query: A selects x ∈ X and sends it to C. In return, C computes
rx ← Eval(sk, x) and sends it to A.
Challenge Query: A selects x∗ ∈ X and sends it to C. In return, C computes
rx∗ ← Eval(sk, x∗) and samples a bit b $← {0, 1}. If b = 0, it sends rx∗ to A,
otherwise it sends to A a random value u← U|rx∗ |.
C sends to A a bit b′.
The advantage of A in the game is Pr[b = b′]− 12 where the probability is over the coins
of C and A. The adversary A is admissible if x∗ does not appear in any of the evaluation
queries. The scheme is computationally secure if for any ppt admissible adversary A,
her advantage in the game is negl(λ).
4 Definition of One-One Constrained PRFs
I Definition 6 (One-One Constrained PRFs). A One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Func-
tion for a predicate family F and an input space X is a tuple of algorithms (Setup,A,B,Rec)
with the following syntax.
Setup(1λ) → K is a PPT algorithm that (possibly) takes a security parameter λ and
outputs a common random string K.
A(K, f)→ Kf is a PPT algorithm that takes a common random string K and a predicate
f ∈ F . It outputs a key Kf .
B(K,x)→ Kx is a deterministic algorithm that takes a common random string K and
an input x ∈ X . It outputs a value Kx.
Rec(x, f,Kf )→ K ′x is a deterministic algorithm that takes an input x ∈ X , a predicate
f ∈ F , and a key Kf . It outputs a value K ′x.
Complexity. We say that the scheme is of complexity p(·, ·, ·) if for every (λ,X ,F), for every
x ∈ X and f ∈ F , for every K,Kf ,Kx where K ← setup(1λ), Kf ← A(K, f), and
Kx ← B(K,x), the size of (K,Kf ,Kx) is O(p(λ, |X | , |F|)).
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Correctness. A one-one constrained PRF is correct if for all f ∈ F and x ∈ X for which
f(x) = 1, for all K ← Setup(1λ), and for all coins of A, it holds that
Rec(x, f,A(K, f)) = B(K,x) .
Security. The security requirement is captured via a game between a challenger C and an
adversary A as follows.
C computes K ← Setup(1λ).
In an order of her choice, A makes two queries:
Challenge Query: A selects x∗ ∈ X and sends it to C. In return, C computes
Kx∗ ← B(K,x∗) and samples a bit b $← {0, 1}. If b = 0, it sends Kx∗ to A,
otherwise it sends to A a random value u← U|Kx∗ |.
Key Query: A selects f∗ ∈ F and sends it to C. In return, C computes Kf∗ ←
A(K, f∗) and sends Kf∗ to A.
A sends to C a bit b′.
The advantage of A in the game is Pr[b = b′]− 12 where the probability is over the coins
of C and A. The scheme is perfectly ( /statistically /computationally) secure if for any
unbounded ( /unbounded /ppt) adversary A that selects x∗, f∗ for which f∗(x∗) = 0, her
advantage in the game is 0 ( /negl(λ) /negl(λ)).
We define key-selective (resp. input-selective) security identically to the definition above,
except that A is forced to make the key query (resp. challenge query) first.
Indistinguishability Based Perfect Security. In the prefect setting, we can omit the security
parameter and selective security implies full security, therefore the following definition is
equivalent to the one above:
A one-one constrained PRF is perfectly secure if for all f∗ ∈ F and x∗ ∈ X for which
f∗(x∗) = 0, the following distributions are identical:
(f∗, x∗,Kf∗ ,Kx∗) ≡ (f∗, x∗,Kf∗ , u)
where K ← Setup(), Kf∗ ← A(K, f∗), Kx∗ ← B(K,x∗), u← U|Kx∗ |.
Note. This is essentially a constrained PRF secure against one constrained key and one
evaluation query. Related primitives: constrained PRFs, conditional disclosure of secrets
(CDS), function secret-sharing.
5 A Lower Bound
We now show that for inequality predicates, the upper bound that we show in Theorem 10 is
tight, i.e., it is not possible to do better than the trivial construction. This means we cannot
hope to achieve efficient information-theoretic constructions for NC1.
I Theorem 7. Let F = {f6=y}y∈F be the family of punctured predicates over some field F,
i.e., for any fixed y ∈ F, f 6=y : F→ {0, 1} where f 6=y(x) = 1 if and only if x 6= y. Then, for
any field F, any one-one constrained PRF for F with perfect correctness and perfect security
is of complexity Ω(|F|).
We now prove Theorem 7. Denote N = |F| and consider all of the field elements x1, . . . , xN
according to some fixed order. Consider the random variable K ← Setup() and for all i ∈ [N ]
consider the random variables Ki and K 6=i defined as:
Ki ← B(K,xi), K6=i ← A(K, f6=xi) .
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B Claim 8. For all i ∈ [N ], it holds that H(Ki | K1, . . . ,Ki−1) ≥ 1.
Proof. Fix an i ∈ [N ]. By the perfect security it holds that (K6=i,Ki) ≡ (K6=i, u) where
u← U|Kx|. Since H(u | K6=i) ≥ 1, it follows that
H(Ki | K6=i) ≥ 1 . (1)
By the perfect correctness, K6=i uniquely determines all of the values {Kj}j 6=i. That is,
H({Kj}j 6=i | K 6=i) = 0 ,
i.e., (by Definition 1)
H({Kj}j 6=i,K6=i) = H(K6=i) ,
and therefore
H(K6=i) ≥ H({Kj}j 6=i) .
Since {K1, . . . ,Ki−1} ⊆ {Kj}j 6=i, it follows that
H(K6=i) ≥ H(K1, . . . ,Ki−1) . (2)
Lastly, equations (1) and (2) imply that
H(Ki | K1, . . . ,Ki−1) ≥ H(Ki | K6=i) ≥ 1 . C
B Claim 9. For any subset I ⊆ [N ], it holds that H({Ki}i∈I) ≥ |I|.
Proof. Fix a subset I ⊆ [N ] and denote I = {i1, . . . , i|I|} such that i1 < i2 < · · · < i|I|. By
Claim 8, for all j = 1, . . . , |I| it holds that
H(Kij | Ki1 , . . . ,Kij−1) ≥ H(Kij | K1, . . . ,Kij−1) ≥ 1 ,
i.e., (by Definition 1)
H(Kij ,Ki1 , . . . ,Kij−1)−H(Ki1 , . . . ,Kij−1) ≥ 1 ,
i.e.,
H(Kij ,Ki1 , . . . ,Kij−1) ≥ 1 +H(Ki1 , . . . ,Kij−1) .
Since this is true for all j = 1, . . . , |I|, it follows that
H({Ki}i∈I) = H(Ki|I| ,Ki1 , . . . ,Ki|I|−1)
≥ 1 +H(Ki1 , . . . ,Ki|I|−1)
≥ 1 + 1 +H(Ki1 , . . . ,Ki|I|−2)
. . .
≥ |I| . C
Consider now an arbitrary i ∈ [N ]. From Claim 9 it holds that H({Kj}j 6=i) ≥ N − 1. Since
H(K6=i) ≥ H({Kj}j 6=i) (see the proof of Claim 8), it follows that H(K6=i) ≥ N − 1. Hence,
for any i ∈ [N ] the size of K 6=i is at least N − 1, which completes the proof. J
ITC 2020
13:10 One-One Constrained Pseudorandom Functions
6 Information-Theoretic Constructions
In this section we consider one-one constrained PRFs with perfect correctness and security.
We begin in Section 6.1 with a generic construction for all predicates over a field F, which
is of complexity O(|F|). We then present more efficient constructions for specific predicate
families; We begin in Section 6.2 with a complexity-preserving composition lemma for the
AND operator. That is, we show that given a one-one cPRF for predicates families F1 and
F2, there is a one-one cPRF for the predicate family F1 ∧F2 of proportional complexity. In
Section 6.3 we show a construction for the equality predicate over a field F with complexity
O(log |F|), which extends to a `-vector-equality construction of complexity O(` · log |F|) via
the generic AND composition. In Section 6.4 we show a construction for the subset relation
with complexity O(N), where N is the maximal size of sets, which extends to t-CNFs with
complexity O(
(
`
t
)·|F|t ·log |F|) as pointed out by [15,27]. In Section 6.5 we construct a one-one
cPRF for inner-product predicates for vectors in F` with complexity O(` · log |F|), which can
be extended to polynomials via embedding of polynomial zero testing as inner-product.
6.1 Generic Predicates
I Theorem 10. Let F be the family of all predicates over some field F, i.e., any f ∈ F is
of the form f : F → {0, 1}. Then, there is a one-one constrained PRF for F with perfect
correctness, perfect security, and complexity O(|F|).
Proof. The construction is as follows.
Setup(): For any y ∈ F sample ky $← {0, 1}. Output K = {ky}y∈F.
A(K, f): Parse K = {ky}y∈F and output Kf = {ky : f(y) = 1}y∈F.
B(K,x): Parse K = {ky}y∈F and output Kx = kx.
Rec(x, f,Kf ): Parse Kf = {ky : f(y) = 1}y∈F. If f(x) = 1 then output kx, otherwise
output ⊥.
Correctness. If f(x) = 1 then kx ∈ Kf .
Security. Consider K ← Setup(), Kf ← A(K, f), Kx ← B(K,x), u $← {0, 1}. If f(x) = 0
then kx /∈ Kf . Since kx is a uniformly sampled bit and H(kx|Kf ) = H(kx), it holds that
(f, x,Kf ,Kx) ≡ (f, x,Kf , u) . J
6.2 AND Composition
I Lemma 11. Let (Setup1,A1,B1,Rec1) and (Setup2,A2,B2,Rec2) be perfect one-one con-
strained PRFs for some predicate families F1 = {f1 : F→ {0, 1}} and F2 = {f2 : F→ {0, 1}}
respectively for some field F, with complexity bounded by some functions P 1 and P 2 re-
spectively. Then, there is a perfect one-one constrained PRF for the predicate family
F1 ∧ F2 = {f1 ∧ f2 : F→ {0, 1}}f1∈F1,f2∈F2 with complexity bounded by P 1 + P 2.
Proof. For simplicity we assume that for all x it holds that
∣∣K1x∣∣ = ∣∣K2x∣∣. This can always
be enforced because it is possible to ignore some of the bits of Kx without compromising
correctness and security. The construction is as follows.
Setup(): Compute K1 ← Setup1() and K2 ← Setup2(), output K = (K1,K2).
A(K, f): Parse K = (K1,K2) and f = f1 ∧ f2. Compute K1f1 ← A1(K1, f1) and
K2f2 ← A2(K2, f2). Output Kf = (K1f1 ,K2f2).
B(K,x): Parse K = (K1,K2). Compute K1x ← B1(K1, x) and K2x ← B2(K2, x). Output
Kx = K1x +K2x.
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Rec(x, f,Kf ): Parse Kf = (K1f1 ,K2f2). Compute R1x ← Rec1(x, f1,K1f1) and R2x ←
Rec2(x, f2,K2f2), output Rx = R1x +R2x.
Correctness. If f(x) = 1 then f1(x) = 1 ∧ f2(x) = 1, therefore by the correctness of the
underlying constructions R1x = K1x and R2x = K2x, thus Rx = Kx.
Security. Consider K ← Setup(), Kf ← A(K, f), Kx ← B(K,x), u ← U|Kx| where K =
(K1,K2), f = f1 ∧ f2, Kf = (K1f1 ,K2f2) and Kx = K1x + K2x. If f(x) = 0 then there
exists i ∈ {1, 2} for which f i(x) = 0. By the security of the underlying constructions it
holds that
(f i, x,Kifi ,Kix) ≡ (f i, x,Kifi , ui) .
where Ki ← Setupi(), Kifi ← Ai(Ki, f i), Kix ← Bi(Ki, x), ui ← U|Kix|. Since the two
instances of the underlying constructions are independent (i.e., H(K1|K2) = H(K1) and
H(K2|K1) = H(K2)), and in particular Kix is independent of (K3−if3−i ,K3−ix ), it follows
that
(f, x,Kf ,Kx) = (f, x, (K1f1 ,K2f2),K1x +K2x)
≡ (f, x, (K1f1 ,K2f2),K3−ix + ui)
≡ (f, x, (K1f1 ,K2f2), u)
= (f, x,Kf , u) . J
6.3 Equality Testing
I Theorem 12. Let F = {fy}y∈F be the family of point predicates over some field F, i.e.,
for any fixed y ∈ F, fy : F → {0, 1} where fy(x) = 1 if and only if x = y. Then, there is
a one-one constrained PRF for F with perfect correctness, perfect security, and complexity
O(log |F|).
Proof. The construction is as follows.
Setup(): Sample k0, k1 $← F and output K = (k0, k1).
A(K, fy): Parse K = (k0, k1) and output Kfy = k0 + yk1.
B(K,x): Parse K = (k0, k1) and output Kx = k0 + xk1.
Rec(x, fy,Kfy ): If x = y then output Kfy , otherwise output ⊥.
Correctness. If fy(x) = 1, i.e., x = y, then Kfy = Kx.
Security. Consider K ← Setup(), Kfy ← A(K, fy), Kx ← B(K,x), u $← F. If fy(x) = 0, i.e.,
x 6= y, then (Kfy ,Kx) = (k0 + yk1, k0 + xk1) are two distinct points on a random linear
function defined by (k0, k1). Since for every possible value of the uniformly sampled u ∈ F
there is a unique (k′0, k′1) ∈ F2 such that k′0 + yk′1 = k0 + yk1 = Kfy and k′0 + xk′1 = u, it
holds that (fy, x,Kfy ,Kx) and (fy, x,Kfy , u) are identically distributed. J
Extensions. The construction above can be extended to other notions as follows.
The predicates family of equality testing of vectors over some field F, i.e., the family
F = {fy}y∈F` where for any fixed y ∈ F`, fy : F` → {0, 1} such that fy(x) = 1 if and only
if x = y. The construction is derived via the AND composition lemma (see Lemma 11)
and is of complexity O(` · log |F|).
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A 1-key t-queries variant, i.e., a construction where for any fy ∈ F and any X ⊆ F/y of
size |X | < t, it holds that
(fy, x,Kfy , {Kx}x∈X ) ≡ (fy, x,Kfy , {ux}x∈X )
where K ← Setup(), Kfy ← A(K, fy), Kx ← B(K,x), ux ← U|Kx|. In the construction,
sample a random polynomial p of degree t as the common random string K and compute
Kx = p(x), Kfy = p(y). The complexity is O(t · log |F|).
6.4 Subset Predicates
I Theorem 13. Let F = {fY }Y⊆[N ] be the family of subset predicate over the set [N ], i.e.,
for any fixed subset Y ⊆ [N ], fY : 2[N ] → {0, 1} and fY (X) = 1 if and only if X ⊆ Y .
Then, there is a one-one constrained PRF for F with perfect correctness, perfect security,
and complexity O(N).
Proof. The construction is as follows.
Setup(): For any i ∈ [N ] sample ki $← {0, 1}. Output K = {ki}i∈[N ].
A(K, fY ): Parse K = {ki}i∈[N ] and output KfY = {ki}i∈Y .
B(K,X): Parse K = {ki}i∈[N ] and output KX =
⊕
i∈X ki.
Rec(X, fY ,KfY ): Parse KfY = {ki}i∈Y . If X ⊆ Y then compute and output K ′X =⊕
i∈X ki, otherwise output ⊥.
Correctness. If fY (X) = 1, i.e., X ⊆ Y , then K ′X = KX .
Security. If fY (X) = 0, i.e., X * Y , then there exists an index i∗ ∈ X such that i∗ /∈ Y ,
therefore
(fY , X, {ki}i∈Y , ki∗) ≡ (f, x, {ki}i∈Y , u)
and thus
(fY , X, {ki}i∈Y ,
⊕
i∈X
ki) ≡ (fY , X, {ki}i∈Y , u)
and thus
(fY , X,KfY ,KX) ≡ (fY , X,KfY , u)
where {ki}i∈[N ] = K ← Setup(), KfY ← A(K, fY ), KX ← B(K,X), u $← {0, 1}. J
Extensions. Using techniques similar to [15,27], the construction above implies a one-one
constrained PRF for the class of t-CNF predicates with inputs of length ` over some field F,
where the construction is of complexity O(
(
`
t
) · |F|t · log |F|).
6.5 Inner-Product Predicates
I Theorem 14. Let F = {fy}y∈F` be the family of inner-product predicates of length-`
vectors over some field F, i.e., for any fixed y ∈ F`, fy : F` → {0, 1} where fy(x) = 1 if and
only if 〈y,x〉 = 0. Then, there is a one-one constrained PRF for F with perfect correctness,
perfect security, and complexity O(` · log |F|).
Proof. The construction is as follows.
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Setup(): Sample v $← F` and w $← F. Output K = (v, w).
A(K, fy): Parse K = (v, w) and output Kfy = wy+ v.
B(K,x): Parse K = (v, w) and output Kx = 〈v,x〉.
Rec(x, fy,Kfy): Output 〈Kfy ,x〉.
Correctness. If fy(x) = 1, i.e., 〈y,x〉 = 0, then
〈Kfy ,x〉 = 〈wy+ v,x〉 = w〈y,x〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+ 〈v,x〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kx
.
Security. If fy(x) = 0, i.e., 〈y,x〉 6= 0, then
(fy,x,Kfy ,Kx) = (fy,x, wy+ v, 〈v,x〉) ≡ (fy,x, wy+ v, u) = (fy,x,Kfy , u)
where K ← Setup(), Kfy ← A(K, fy), Kx ← B(K,x), u $← F.
To see that, fix some values (y,x, u). Sample a random v under the constraint that
〈v,x〉 = u, then sample w and output (fy,x, wy+ v, u). J
7 Removing the One-One Restriction via Key-Homomorphic PRF
In this section we consider one-one cPRFs that satisfy an additional property and show that
such one-one cPRFs can be boosted to standard cPRFs via key-homomorphic PRFs. We
then show that all of our information-theoretic one-one cPRFs satisfy this property, thus
receiving new cPRF constructions.
In more detail, we require an alternative algorithm for Alice, dkA(K, f), that produces
a double-key (Kf , Kˆf ). Such double-key should have the property that Kˆf looks uniformly
random even given Kf , but on the other hand, given both of the key parts (Kf , Kˆf ) it
should be possible to compute Kx for all x (regardless of f(x)). We now formally define this
additional property.
I Definition 15. A one-one constrained pseudorandom function for a predicate family F and
an input space X is in the double-key model, if in addition to the algorithms (Setup,B,Rec)
as in Definition 6, there exists algorithms dkA and dkRec with the following syntax.
dkA(K, f)→ (Kf , Kˆf ) is a PPT algorithm that takes a common random string K and a
predicate f ∈ F . It outputs a pair of keys (Kf , Kˆf ).
dkRec(x, f,Kf , Kˆf )→ K ′x is a deterministic algorithm that takes an input x, a predicate
f ∈ F , and a pair of keys (Kf , Kˆf ). It outputs a value K ′x.
(Standard) Correctness. A one-one constrained PRF is correct if it satisfies standard cor-
rectness (as in Definition 6) with respect to the keys Kf . That is, for all f ∈ F and
x ∈ X for which f(x) = 1, for all K ← Setup(1λ), and for all (Kf , Kˆf )← dkA(K, f), it
holds that Rec(x, f,Kf ) = B(K,x).
Correctness of Double-Keys. A one-one constrained PRF has correct double-key if for all
f ∈ F and x ∈ X for which f(x) = 0, for all K ← Setup(1λ), and for all (Kf , Kˆf ) ←
dkA(K, f), it holds that dkRec(x, f,Kf , Kˆf ) = B(K,x).
Security of Double-Keys. The scheme has perfect ( /statistical /computational) double-key
security if for any f ∈ F and any unbounded ( /unbounded /ppt) distinguisher, the fol-
lowing distributions are identical ( /statistically close /computationally indistinguishable).
(f,Kf , Kˆf ) ≡ (f,Kf , u)
where K ← Setup(1λ), (Kf , Kˆf )← dkA(K, f), u← U|Kˆf |.
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Given the new definition in hand, we now state the main theorem.
I Theorem 16. Let (KeyGen,Eval,HomKeyEval) be a key-homomorphic PRF for an in-
put space Xα, a key space K, and a function family G = {Gn : Kn → K}n∈N, and let
(Setup, dkA,B,Rec, dkRec) be a one-one cPRF in the double-key model (as in Definition 15)
for an input space Xβ and a predicate family F , such that:
The key space K is some field F and the algorithm KeyGen(1λ) outputs a random value
sk $← F.
For all x ∈ Xβ and all K ← Setup(1λ) it holds that Kx ∈ F where Kx ← B(K,x) and F
is the same field as above.
For all f ∈ F there exists n ∈ N such that for all K ← Setup(1λ) it holds that Kˆf ∈ Fn,
where (Kf , Kˆf )← dkA(K, f) and F is the same field as above.
For all x ∈ Xβ and f ∈ F such that f(x) = 0, and all (Kf , Kˆf ) ← dkA(K, f) where
K ← Setup(1λ), let dkRecx,f,Kf : Fn → F denote the algorithm dkRec with the hard-coded
inputs (x, f,Kf ), i.e., dkRecx,f,Kf (·) = dkRec(x, f,Kf , ·). Then:
dkRecx,f,Kf (·) can be homomorphically evaluated over keys of the key-homomorphic
scheme, i.e., dkRecx,f,Kf (·) ∈ G.
dkRecx,f,Kf (·) preserves uniformity, i.e., the distributions dkRecx,f,Kf (UFn) and UF
are identical.
Then, there exists a key-selective secure single-key constrained PRF for the predicate family
F and the input space X = Xα ∩ Xβ.
7.1 The Reduction
We proceed to the proof of Theorem 16. Assuming a key-homomorphic PRF and a one-one
constrained PRF as described in the theorem, the constrained PRF is defined as follows.
I Construction 17. Define:
CPRF.KeyGen(1λ): Compute K ← Setup(1λ) and output msk = K.
CPRF.Eval(msk, x): Parse msk = K. Compute Kx := B(K,x) and output rx :=
EvalKx(x).
CPRF.Con(msk, f): Parse msk = K. Compute (Kf , Kˆf )← dkA(K, f) and output skf =
(f,Kf ).
CPRF.ConEval(skf , x): Parse skf = (f,Kf ). Compute K ′x := Rec(x, f,Kf ) and output
r′x := EvalK′x(x).
Correctness of Constrained Keys. Fix x ∈ X and f ∈ F for which f(x) = 1, and
msk ← CPRF.KeyGen(1λ), skf ← CPRF.Con(msk, f). Then msk = K and skf = (f,Kf )
where K ← Setup(1λ) and (Kf , Kˆf ) ← dkA(K, f). Consider CPRF.ConEval(skf , x) and in
particular K ′x = Rec(x, f,Kf ), then by the standard correctness of the one-one cPRF, since
f(x) = 1 it holds that K ′x = Kx and therefore EvalK′x(x) = EvalKx(x).
Pseudorandomness. We now prove that Construction 17 is a single-key key-selective secure
constrained PRF as in Definition 4. The proof goes via a sequence of hybrids.
Proof. Hybrid H0. This is the real security game as in Definition 4. Note that this is the
selective-key game, i.e., the key query for f happens before any other queries. Explicitly,
C computes K ← Setup(1λ) and then immediately answers the key query:
Key Query: Upon receiving f ∈ F , C computes (Kf , Kˆf )← dkA(K, f) and sends Kf
to A.
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In the rest of the game C answers queries made by A as follows.
Evaluation Query: Upon receiving x ∈ X , C computes Kx := B(K,x) and rx :=
EvalKx(x).
It sends rx to A.
Challenge Query: Upon receiving x∗ ∈ X , C computes Kx∗ := B(K,x∗) and rx∗ :=
EvalKx∗ (x∗).
It samples a bit b $← {0, 1}. If b = 0, it sends rx∗ to A, otherwise it sends to A a
random value u← U|rx∗ |.
Hybrid H1. In this hybrid we change the way that C evaluates Kx when it answers evaluation
queries and the challenge query. Instead of using the common random string K, it will
use the double-key (Kf , Kˆf ). That is, upon receiving x ∈ X , instead of computing
Kx := B(K,x) it computes
Kx :=
{
Rec(x, f,Kf ) f(x) = 1
dkRec(x, f,Kf , Kˆf ) f(x) = 0
and then proceeds as in the previous hybrid. Due to the prefect standard correctness and
correctness of double-keys, the distributions that C outputs in Hybrids H0 and H1 are
identical.
Hybrid H2. Note that C does not use K anymore except of when it first generates (Kf , Kˆf ).
In this hybrid we change Kˆf to uniform. That is, after computing (Kf , Kˆf )← dkA(K, f),
C samples a random value u← U|Kˆf | and overrides the value of Kˆf such that Kˆf := u.
By the perfect ( /statistical /computational) security of double-keys, the distributions
that C outputs in hybrids H1 and H2 are identical ( /statistically close /computationally
indistinguishable).
Hybrid H3. In this hybrid we change the way that C evaluates rx when it answers evalu-
ation queries and the challenge query, whenever f(x) = 0. Recall that in the previous
hybrid it computes rx := EvalKx(x) where Kx := dkRec(x, f,Kf , Kˆf ), and recall that
by assumption, dkRecx,f,Kf (·) = dkRec(x, f,Kf , ·) can be homomorphically evaluated
over the PRF key-space using HomKeyEval. Moreover, by our assumption it holds that
Kˆf ∈ Fn for some n ∈ N. Therefore,
rx = EvalKx(x)
= EvaldkRec(x,f,Kf ,Kˆf )(x)
= EvaldkRecx,f,Kf (Kˆf )(x)
= HomKeyEval
(
dkRecx,f,Kf , EvalKˆ1
f
(x), . . . ,EvalKˆn
f
(x)
)
where Kˆf = (Kˆ1f , . . . , Kˆnf ). In this hybrid, C first computes six := EvalKˆi
f
(x) for all i ∈ [n],
and then
rx := HomKeyEval
(
dkRecx,f,Kf , s1x, . . . , snx
)
.
By the perfect correctness of homomorphic key evaluation, the distributions that C
outputs in hybrids H2 and H3 are identical.
Hybrid H4. In this hybrid we change the way that C evaluates s1x, . . . , snx whenever f(x) = 0.
Note that in Hybrid H3 the value Kˆf , which is uniformly random in Fn, is only used when
computing six := EvalKˆi
f
(x) for all i ∈ [n]. Thus, we can replace the values s1x, . . . , snx with
uniformly random strings. That is, whenever a query is made for an x such that f(x) = 0,
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C samples s1x, . . . , snx $← {0, 1}∗ of appropriate size and then proceeds as in the previous
hybrid. By the pseudorandomness of the key-homomorphic PRF respective to the keys
Kˆ1f , . . . , Kˆ
n
f , the distributions that C outputs in hybrids H3 and H4 are computationally
indistinguishable.
Hybrid H5. We change again the way that C evaluates rx whenever f(x) = 0. In this hybrid
the values rx are replaced with uniformly sampled strings. Indistinguishability will follow
immediately from the next lemma, since s1x, . . . , snx are random values and dkRecx,f,Kf (·)
preserves uniformity. J
I Lemma 18. Let (KeyGen,Eval,HomKeyEval) be a secure key-homomorphic PRF for a
key space K and a function family G = {Gn : Kn → K}n∈N, where valid keys are samples
from UK and the output space is O. Let g ∈ Gn be a function such that g(UKn) and
UK are computationally indistinguishable. Then, the distribution HomKeyEval(g,UOn) is
computationally indistinguishable from UO.
Proof. Via hybrids:
1. The distribution HomKeyEval(g,UOn).
2. The distribution HomKeyEval (g,EvalUK(0), . . . ,EvalUK(0)) (Ind. by the pseudorandom-
ness). Note that the distribution EvalUK(0) is concatenated n times and that the PRF
input 0 was chosen arbitrarily.
3. The distribution Evalg(UKn )(0) (Ind. by the correctness of homomorphic key evaluation).
4. The distribution EvalUK(0) (Ind. by the assumption about g).
5. The distribution UO (Ind. by the pseudorandomness). J
7.2 Constructions of One-One cPRFs in the Double-Key Model
We now show that all of our information-theoretic constructions (see Section 6) have a double-
key variant (see Definition 15) of the same complexity. Moreover, in all of those double-key
constructions, the corresponding function dkRecx,f,Kf (see Theorem 16 for definition) is
linear and preserves uniformity. Due to the similarity to the constructions in Section 6, we
provide here an overview.
Generic Predicates. For an input space F and any predicate family F , the common random
string K = {ky}y∈F consists of random bits ky $← {0, 1} for every element in the field. The
value Kx is then simply kx. The double-key for a predicate f splits K into a set of authorized
inputs Kf = {ky : f(y) = 1}y∈F and a set of unauthorized inputs Kˆf = {ky : f(y) = 0}y∈F.
Clearly, Kˆf is uniformly distributed even given Kf , and recovering a value kx from Kˆf is a
linear function.
AND Composition. Consider two perfect one-one cPRFs in the double-key model for some
predicate families F1 = {f1} and F2 = {f2}. In the construction for the predicate family
F1∧F2 = {f1∧f2}f1∈F1,f2∈F2 , there is one instance of each of the underlying constructions.
The common random string K = (K1,K2) and double-keys Kf = (K1f1 ,K2f2) and Kˆf =
(Kˆ1f1 , Kˆ2f2) where f = f1∧f2 are a concatenation of the corresponding values in the underlying
schemes. The values Kx = K1x+K2x are the sum of the corresponding values in the underlying
schemes. Since the two instances are secure and generated independently, uniformity of Kˆf
given Kf follows immediately. Moreover, the algorithm dkRec(x, f,Kf , Kˆf ) that computes
and outputs dkRec1(x, f1,K1f1 , Kˆ1f1) + dkRec
2(x, f2,K2f2 , Kˆ2f2) is clearly correct, linear in
Kˆf , and preserves uniformity if the underlying schemes are correct, linear in Kˆ1f1 and Kˆ2f2 ,
and preserve uniformity.
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Equality Testing. Consider equality testing over some field F. The common random
string K = (k0, k1) consists of two random elements in the field k0, k1
$← F, and we define
Kx = k0 +xk1. The double-key for some value y is defined as Kfy = k0 +yk1 and Kˆfy = yk1.
Note that by the uniformity of k0 and k1, for all y 6= 0 the key part Kˆfy is distributed
uniformly in F even given Kfy . To reconstruct Kx for some x 6= y, compute
dkRec(x, y,Kfy , Kˆfy ) =
x− y
y
Kˆfy +Kfy = (x− y)k1 + k0 + yk1 = k0 + xk1 = Kx ,
which is correct and linear in Kˆfy .
Subset Predicates. Recall that we consider all subsets X ⊆ [N ] as the input space and all
subsets Y ⊆ [N ] as the predicate family, such that fY (X) = 1 if and only if X ⊆ Y . The
common random string K = {ki}i∈[N ] consists of random bits ki $← {0, 1} for every element
in the set [N ]. The value KX is then set to KX =
⊕
i∈X ki. The double-key for a predicate
fY splits K into a set of authorized elements KfY = {ki}i∈Y and a set of unauthorized
elements KˆfY = {ki}i∈[N ]/Y . Clearly, KˆfY is uniformly distributed even given KfY , and
recovering a value ki from (KfY , KˆfY ) is a linear function that preserves uniformity.
Inner-Product Predicates. Consider inner-product testing of vectors of length ` over some
field F. The common random string K = (v, w) consists of a random vector v $← F` and a
random field element w $← F. We define Kx = 〈v,x〉. The double-key for a vector predicate
y is defined as Kfy = wy+ v and Kˆfy = w. Note that by the uniformity of v and w, the
key part Kˆfy is distributed uniformly in F even given Kfy . To reconstruct Kx for some x,
compute
dkRec(x, fy,Kfy , Kˆfy) = 〈Kfy ,x〉 − Kˆfy〈y,x〉 = 〈wy+ v,x〉 − w〈y,x〉 = 〈v,x〉 = Kx ,
which is correct, linear in Kˆfy , and preserves uniformity.
8 One-One Constrained PRF and CDS Protocols
In this section we study the connection between one-one constrained PRFs and conditional
disclosure of secrets (CDS) protocols, a cryptographic primitive used to construct many
secure protocols (see discussion in the introduction). In CDS protocols, Alice and Bob hold
a secret and a common random string, and each of them holds a private input for some
two-input predicate. Then, each of the parties sends one message to a referee, which is based
on its private input, the secret, and the common random string. The referee, knowing the
inputs of the parties, should learn the secret if and only if the inputs of the parties satisfy the
predicate. We next provide a formal definition of CDS protocols, originally presented in [20].
I Definition 19 (Conditional Disclosure of Secrets Protocols). Let f : X × Y → {0, 1}
be a predicate. A conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) protocol P for f with domain
of secrets S, domain of common random strings R, and finite message domains MA,MB
consists of two deterministic message computation functions EncA,EncB, where EncA :
X ×S×R→MA and EncB : Y ×S×R→MB, and a deterministic reconstruction function
Dec : X × Y ×MA ×MB → S. We say that P is a CDS protocol for f if it satisfies the
following requirements.
Correctness. For every inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y for which f(x, y) = 1, every secret s ∈ S,
and every common random string r ∈ R,
Dec(x, y,EncA(x, s, r),EncB(y, s, r)) = s .
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Security. For every inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y for which f(x, y) = 0 and every secret s ∈ S,
(x, y,EncA(x, s, r),EncB(y, s, r), s) ≡ (x, y,EncA(x, s, r),EncB(y, s, r), u)
where r $← R and u $← S.
Message Size. The message size of a CDS protocol P is defined as the sizes of the messages
sent by the parties, i.e., log |MA|+ log |MB |.
We consider the index predicate, which gets as inputs an N -bit string (or a database) D
and an index i ∈ [N ], and returns the ith bit in D, denoted by Di.
I Definition 20 (The Index Function). The index predicate is the predicate findex : {0, 1}N ×
[N ]→ {0, 1}, where findex(D, i) = Di.
We next show a transformation that preservers complexity from one-one constrained
PRFs to CDS protocols for the index predicate.
I Theorem 21. Let findex : {0, 1}N × [N ]→ {0, 1} be the index predicate, and assume that
for every predicate f : [N ]→ {0, 1} there is a one-one constrained PRF for f with complexity
c(N). Then, there is a CDS protocol for findex with message size c(N).
Proof. We consider a one-one constrained PRF scheme, when Alice holds a predicate
f : [N ] → {0, 1}, Bob holds an input x ∈ [N ], and both hold a common random string
K ← Setup(1λ), where Kf ← A(K, f) and Kx ← B(K,x). By the correctness requirement
of the one-one constrained PRF, if f(x) = 1 then there exist a deterministic function Rec
such that Rec(x, f,Kf ) = Kx, and by security requirement, if f(x) = 0 then (f, x,Kf ,Kx) ≡
(f, x,Kf , u), where u← U|Kx|.
We show a construction of a CDS protocol for the index predicate findex, which is based
on the above one-one constrained PRF. The construction is as follows.
Inputs: Alice holds D ∈ {0, 1}N and Bob holds i ∈ [N ]. We represent D as the predicate
fD : [N ]→ {0, 1}, where fD(j) = findex(D, j) = Dj .
The secret: A string s of size at most |B(K, i)|.
The common random string: An element K ← Setup(1λ).
EncA(D,K): Alice computes and sends the message EncA(D,K) = A(K, fD) = KfD .
EncB(i,K): Bob computes and sends the message EncB(i,K) = B(K, i)⊕ s′ = Ki ⊕ s′,
where s′ = 0t ◦ s such that |s′| = |B(K, i)|.
Dec(D, i,EncA(D,K),EncB(i,K)): If findex(D, i) = 1, the referee computes
Rec(i, fD,EncA(D,K))⊕ EncB(i,K).
Correctness. If findex(D, i) = 1, i.e., fD(i) = 1, then the referee computes
Rec(i, fD,EncA(D,K))⊕ EncB(i,K) = Rec(i, fD,KfD )⊕Ki ⊕ s′ = Ki ⊕Ki ⊕ s′ = s′
where the second equality follows from the correctness of the one-one constrained PRF.
Hence, the referee learns s′ and so the secret s.
Security. If findex(D, i) = 0, i.e., fD(i) = 0, then by the security of the one-one constrained
PRF,
(fD, i,A(K, fD),B(K, i)) ≡ (fD, i,A(K, fD, ), u)
where K ← Setup(1λ) and u ← U|B(K,i)|. Then, since s′ = EncB(i,K)⊕ B(K, i) we get
that
(D, i,EncA(D,K),EncB(i,K), s′) ≡ (D, i,EncA(D,K),EncB(i,K), u)
where K ← Setup(1λ) and u← U|s′|.
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Message size. The message size of this CDS protocol is equal to the complexity of the
one-one constrained PRF, which is c(N). J
Using the above result and the reduction that appears in [18], from CDS protocols for
general predicates to CDS protocols for the index predicate, we get a transformation from
one-one constrained PRF to CDS protocols for general predicates.
I Corollary 22. Let g : [N ]× [N ]→ {0, 1} be a predicate, and assume that for every predicate
f : [N ]→ {0, 1} there is a one-one constrained PRF for f with complexity c(N). Then, there
is a CDS protocol for g with message size c(N).
Note the best known CDS protocol for general predicates g : [N ]×[N ]→ {0, 1} has message
size 2O(
√
logN log logN) [25]. Thus, by the above lower bound of Ω(N) on the complexity
of one-one constrained PRFs of Theorem 7, we cannot get a similar transformation that
preserve complexity in the other direction (i.e., a transformation from CDS protocols to
one-one constrained PRFs).
9 Computational Constructions
Every single-key constrained PRF is in particular a one-one constrained PRF under the same
security notion (which is either adaptive, key selective or challenge selective, see Definition 6).
For completeness, we now go over some of the known computational constructions in the
literature of single-key constrained PRFs.
9.1 Constructions from OWFs
Punctured Predicates. As was shown in [12,13, 23], the OWF-based PRF of [21] is in fact
puncturable. Using our previous terminology, it supports punctured predicates over the input
space {0, 1}n as defined in Theorem 7. The complexity of the construction is O(λ · n) where
λ is the security parameter. Furthermore, [17] showed that the aforementioned construction
satisfies adaptive security with a security loss exponential in the number of queries. Since we
focus on the single-query scenario, we can use their proof strategy to claim adaptive security
on the implied one-one cPRF.
I Theorem 23. Let F = {fy}y∈{0,1}n be the family of punctured predicates over the set of
n-bit strings, i.e., for any fixed y ∈ {0, 1}n, f6=y : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} where f6=y(x) = 1 if and
only if x 6= y. Then, for every security parameter λ, there is a one-one constrained PRF for
F with perfect correctness, computational adaptive security, and complexity O(λ · n).
One-Dimensional Interval Predicates. [23] showed how to further generalized the [21]
approach in order to support (one-dimensional) interval predicates without compromising
the complexity. Such predicates allow to compute the PRF on all inputs x that are within
some range [a, b], i.e., all x such that a ≤ x ≤ b, where the key size is O(λ · log |b− a|). Due
to the similarity to the construction for punctured predicates, the adaptive security proof
strategy of [17] can also be applied here.
I Theorem 24. Let F = {f[a,b]}a,b∈{0,1}n be the family of one-dimensional interval predicates
over the set of n-bit strings, i.e., for any fixed a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, f[a,b] : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} where
f[a,b](x) = 1 if and only if a ≤ x ≤ b. Then, for every security parameter λ, there is a
one-one constrained PRF for F with perfect correctness, computational adaptive security,
and complexity O(λ · n).
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Multi-Dimensional Interval Predicates. We now consider multi-dimensional interval predic-
ates (that were previously studied in [11,19,26]). Such predicates are characterized by d inter-
vals {[ai, bi]}i∈[d], and the input space is ({0, 1}n)d. An input X = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ ({0, 1}n)d
is authorized by the multi-dimensional predicate f[ai,bi]i∈[d] if and only if ai ≤ xi ≤ bi for all
i ∈ [d]. Each interval [ai, bi] can be verified by checking the n bits of the input corresponding
to xi. In particular, in order to verify that the ith dimension of X (i.e., xi) is within the ith
range [ai, bi], we have to check whether the ith block of n bits of X is within the range [ai, bi].
To do so, we will use the AND composition lemma (that is, Lemma 11) sequentially d− 1
times on d independent instances of one-one cPRFs for one-dimensional interval predicates
over inputs of length n (as in Theorem 24), where each instance i handles the ith block of X.
I Theorem 25. Let F = {f[ai,bi]i∈[d]}ai,bi∈{0,1}n,i∈[d] be the family of d-dimensional interval
predicates over the set of n-bit strings, i.e., for any fixed ai, bi ∈ {0, 1}n for all i ∈ [d],
f[ai,bi]i∈[d] : ({0, 1}n)d → {0, 1} where f[ai,bi]i∈[d](x1, . . . , xd) = 1 if and only if ai ≤ xi ≤ bi
for all i ∈ [d]. Then, for every security parameter λ, there is a one-one constrained PRF for
Fn with perfect correctness, computational adaptive security, and complexity O(d · λ · n).
9.2 Additional Constructions
Lattice Assumptions. [10] construct a selectively-secure single-key cPRF for all circuits from
LWE. [14] construct an adaptively-secure single-key cPRF for NC1 from LWE.
Group Assumptions. [6] construct a selectively-secure single-key bit-fixing cPRF from DDH.
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